| The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action Contributor(s): Fiscus, Ronald J. (Author) |
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ISBN: 0822317702 ISBN-13: 9780822317708 Publisher: Duke University Press OUR PRICE: $23.70 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: January 1996 Annotation: Few issues are as mired in rhetoric and controversy as is affirmative action. This book cuts to the heart of the issue with precision and eloquence. A compelling and rigorously reasoned argument for a constitutional rationale of affirmative action, it will enhance future debate by clarifying the moral and legal ramifications of this complex, politically charged subject. Ronald J. Fiscus begins by drawing a distinction between compensatory and distributive justice. He argues that compensatory justice, although it is the principle underlying efforts to provide remedies in specific, individual cases of discrimination, does not provide an appropriate basis for justifying broader programs of affirmative action. Fiscus proposes instead that affirmative action programs can be justified by a theory of distributive justice, which, he argues, avoids the pitfalls that trouble current approaches to affirmative action. His argument begins with the stipulated assumption of equality at birth. Under that assumption, there would be a distribution of opportunity proportionate to society's racial and gender composition. In a society free of all discrimination, for instance, if 20 percent of the population were black, then 20 percent of all jobs, promotions, college acceptances, etc., would go to blacks. Any deviation from this distribution could only be attributed to discrimination. Emphasizing race rather than gender (to which his argument also applies), Fiscus focuses on the argument accepted by the Supreme Court in reverse discrimination cases, that whites, particularly white males, are "innocent victims" of affirmative action plans. He argues that proportional quotas do not produce "innocent victims"because those holding positions in excess of what proportionality would provide are not entitled to them. Fiscus argues for quotas--but only quotas that are proportionate to the racial composition of society. Disproportional quotas are not acceptable in his theory of distributive justice. The author focuses upon the Supreme Court's affirmative action rulings from Bakke (1976) through Croson (1989), explaining and analyzing these cases extensively. More recent rulings and the 1990s battles over quotas are discussed in an epilogue by Stephen L.Wasby, who edited the book after Fiscus's death in 1990. While presenting a lucid and persuasive case for affirmative action, The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action also provides a clear overview of the issues surrounding this difficult topic. It is a passionate, yet balanced plea for an intellectual understanding of an issue that often sparks highly rhetorical and emotional debate. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Political Science | American Government - General |
| Dewey: 347.302 |
| LCCN: 91033695 |
| Lexile Measure: 1610 |
| Physical Information: 0.56" H x 5.55" W x 9.06" (0.60 lbs) 176 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: Few issues are as mired in rhetoric and controversy as affirmative action. This is certainly no less true now as when Ronald J. Fiscus's The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action was first published in 1992. The controversy has, perhaps, become more charged over the past few years. With this compelling and rigorously reasoned argument for a constitutional rationale of affirmative action, Fiscus clarifies the moral and legal ramifications of this complex subject and presents an important view in the context of the ongoing debate. Beginning with a distinction drawn between principles of compensatory and distributive justice, Fiscus argues that the former, although often the basis for judgments made in individual discrimination cases, cannot sufficiently justify broad programs of affirmative action. Only a theory of distributive justice, one that assumes minorities have a right to what they would have gained proportionally in a nonracist society, can persuasively provide that justification. On this basis, the author argues in favor of proportional racial quotas-and challenges the charge of "reverse discrimination" raised in protest in the name of the "innocent victims" of affirmative action-as an action necessary to approach the goals of fairness and equality. The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action focuses on Supreme Court affirmative action rulings from Bakke (1976) to Croson (1989) and includes an epilogue by editor Stephen L. Wasby that considers developments through 1995. General readers concerned with racial justice, affirmative action, and public policy, as well as legal specialists and constitutional scholars will find Fiscus's argument passionate, balanced, and persuasive. |