| The Non-Reality of Free Will Contributor(s): Double, Richard (Author) |
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ISBN: 0195064976 ISBN-13: 9780195064971 Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA OUR PRICE: $207.90 Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats Published: November 1990 Annotation: The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Philosophy | Free Will & Determinism |
| Dewey: 123.5 |
| LCCN: 90033531 |
| Physical Information: 1" H x 5.82" W x 8.61" (0.99 lbs) 272 pages |
| Themes: - Theometrics - Academic |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion. |
