| Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility Contributor(s): Russell, Paul (Author) |
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ISBN: 0195095014 ISBN-13: 9780195095012 Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA OUR PRICE: $198.00 Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats Published: December 1995 Annotation: Russell contends that it is the workings of moral sentiment, and not the concept of freedom, that is basic to Hume's account of moral responsibility. The compatibilist strategy that Hume pursues must be interpreted in terms of his detailed description of the circumstances in which people are felt to be responsible. These naturalistic commitments are directly relevant to Hume's complex understanding of how freedom relates to responsibility. It is his view that we must not exaggerate the importance of voluntariness and control for moral responsibility. Hume's naturalism is also essential to his account of the relationship between responsibility and religion. Issues of moral responsibility, Hume maintains, can be understood only within the fabric of human feeling and human society. This perspective on responsibility is central to the philosopher's most basic objective: to secularize our understanding of moral life and practice. The classical reading entirely overlooks Hume's naturalistic concerns and commitments. As Russell demonstrates, however, it is this very aspect that is fundamental to Hume's general strategy and that is of particular significance from a contemporary perspective. The contemporary relevance of Hume's naturalistic approach is examined with P. F. Strawson's influential contribution on this subject especially in view. Freedom and Moral Sentiment addresses issues of wide interest to students and scholars of philosophy, theology, legal theory, and the history of ideas. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Philosophy | Free Will & Determinism - Philosophy | Ethics & Moral Philosophy - Philosophy | History & Surveys - General |
| Dewey: 123.5 |
| LCCN: 95001110 |
| Physical Information: 0.8" H x 6.36" W x 9.26" (1.09 lbs) 216 pages |
| Themes: - Theometrics - Academic |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: In this book, Russell examines Hume's notion of free will and moral responsibility. It is widely held that Hume presents us with a classic statement of the compatibilist position--that freedom and responsibility can be reconciled with causation and, indeed, actually require it. Russell argues that this is a distortion of Hume's view, because it overlooks the crucial role of moral sentiment in Hume's picture of human nature. Hume was concerned to describe the regular mechanisms which generate moral sentiments such as responsibility, and Russell argues that his conception of free will must be interpreted within this naturalistic framework. He goes on to discuss Hume's views about the nature and character of moral sentiment; the extent to which we have control over our moral character; and the justification of punishment. Throughout, Russell argues that the naturalistic avenue of interpretation of Hume's thought, far from draining it of its contemporary interest and significance, reveals it to be of great relevance to the ongoing contemporary debate. |
