| Breakdown in Communication Contributor(s): Cumming, Robert Denoon (Author) |
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ISBN: 0226123707 ISBN-13: 9780226123707 Publisher: University of Chicago Press OUR PRICE: $99.99 Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats Published: July 2001 Annotation: The most notorious breakdown in communication in twentieth-century philosophy was between Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Husserl had earlier been fond of saying to Heidegger, "You and I are phenomenology," but their break came with the publication of Heidegger's "Being and Time", which Cumming argues cannot be understood itself simply as a deconstruction of the philosophical tradition at large, which is how it is presented by Heidegger (and usually by his interpreters). Rather, at crucial junctures, it is specifically the deconstruction of Husserl's phenomenology. Cumming not only brings out the differences between Husserl's and Heidegger's conceptions of phenomenological method, he also clarifies his own interpretative procedure by comparing it with Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Philosophy | History & Surveys - Modern - Philosophy | Movements - Phenomenology |
| Dewey: 142.709 |
| LCCN: 91012696 |
| Series: Phenomenology & Deconstruction (Hardcover) |
| Physical Information: 1.1" H x 7.23" W x 9.23" (1.25 lbs) 280 pages |
| Themes: - Theometrics - Academic |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: Philosophers are committed to objective understanding, but the history of philosophy demonstrates how frequently one philosopher misunderstands another. The most notorious such breakdown in communication in twentieth-century philosophy was between Husserl and Heidegger. In the third volume of his history of the phenomenological movement, Robert Denoon Cumming argues that their differences involve differences in method; whereas Husserl follows a method of clarification, with which he eliminates ambiguities by relying on an intentional analysis that isolates its objects, Heidegger rejects the criterion of clarity and embraces ambiguities as exhibiting overlapping relations. Cumming also explores the differences between how deconstruction--Heidegger's procedure for dealing with other philosophers--is carried out when Heidegger interprets Husserl versus when Derrida interprets Husserl. The comparison enables Cumming to show how deconstruction is associated with Heidegger's arrival at the end of philosophy, paving the way for the deconstructionist movement. |
