| Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection Revised Edition Contributor(s): Samuelson, Larry (Author) |
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ISBN: 0262692198 ISBN-13: 9780262692199 Publisher: MIT Press OUR PRICE: $34.65 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: September 1998 Annotation: Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In "Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection," he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book goes on to discuss evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Business & Economics | Economics - Theory - Mathematics | Game Theory |
| Dewey: 519.3 |
| Series: Economic Learning and Social Evolution |
| Physical Information: 0.64" H x 5.98" W x 8.97" (0.97 lbs) 328 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria. |
Contributor Bio(s): Samuelson, Larry: - Larry Samuelson is A. Douglas Melamed Professor of Economics at Yale University. |