| Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations 2006 Edition Contributor(s): Plasmans, Joseph E. J. K. (Author), Engwerda, Jacob (Author), Van Aarle, Bas (Author) |
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ISBN: 0387278842 ISBN-13: 9780387278841 Publisher: Springer OUR PRICE: $161.49 Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats Published: May 2006 Annotation: Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations analyzes coordination of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies between countries and currency areas using a dynamic game approach. The first four chapters introduce the reader to the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy cooperation. Issues covered include: fiscal coordination, fiscal stringency requirements, structural and bargaining power asymmetries and the design of monetary and fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. In the four last chapters multiple-player settings with aspects of fiscal and/or monetary coordination are analyzed using the endogenous coalition formation approach. The analysis is focused on shock and model asymmetries and issues of multi-country coordination in the presence of (possibly many) monetary unions. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Business & Economics | Economics - Macroeconomics - Business & Economics | International - Economics - Mathematics | Game Theory |
| Dewey: 332.456 |
| LCCN: 2007276807 |
| Series: Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance |
| Physical Information: 0.81" H x 6.14" W x 9.21" (1.45 lbs) 324 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations analyzes coordination of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies between countries and currency areas using a dynamic game approach. The first four chapters introduce the reader to the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy cooperation. Issues covered include: fiscal coordination, fiscal stringency requirements, structural and bargaining power asymmetries and the design of monetary and fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. In the four last chapters multiple-player settings with aspects of fiscal and/or monetary coordination are analyzed using the endogenous coalition formation approach. The analysis is focused on shock and model asymmetries and issues of multi-country coordination in the presence of (possibly many) monetary unions. |