| The Cooperator's Dilemma Contributor(s): Lichbach, Mark I. (Editor) |
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ISBN: 0472105728 ISBN-13: 9780472105724 Publisher: University of Michigan Press OUR PRICE: $89.05 Product Type: Hardcover Published: June 1996 Annotation: Over the past twenty-five years, theorists have proposed over two dozen different sets of solutions to the Public Goods-Prisoner's Dilemma game. The book employs a fourfold typology of market, community, contract, and hierarchy to sort these solutions and investigate whether they actually produce cooperation. Further, it uses two analytical standards for evaluating proposed solutions: a solution must be complete in that it alone turns inaction to action and consistent in that it develops out of the pecuniary self-interest kernel of the program. It turns out that these standards are in conflict: if we try to make collective action theories logically complete, they become logically inconsistent; if we try to make them consistent, they become incomplete. Professor Lichbach demonstrates how this trade-off forces us to delimit the scope and boundaries of collective action theories and to appreciate how they might be combined with culturalist and institutionalist approaches. The Cooperator's Dilemma provides a remarkably up-to-date and comprehensive statement and assessment of collective action thinking. It will be important reading for the diverse and growing audience of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists who are interested in collective action and Public Goods-Prisoner's Dilemma issues and research. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Social Science - Business & Economics | Economics - General - Political Science |
| Dewey: 303.3 |
| LCCN: 95004601 |
| Series: Economics, Cognition, & Society Series |
| Physical Information: 1.3" H x 6.34" W x 9.31" (1.63 lbs) 336 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: In The Cooperator's Dilemma, Mark Lichbach provides an up-to-date and complete evaluation of the collective-action approach. A special strength of the work is that it integrates in a unique way both game theoretic and micro- economics approaches to the collective-action problem. Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods issues are thus discussed with a common collective-action framework. Another distinctive feature is the author's development and application of a unique typology of solutions to the collective-action solutions he labels: market, community, contract and hierarchy. In the comprehensive review of collective-action theories, two criteria are employed to evaluate them. First, the logical completeness of every collective- action solution is considered. Lichbach argues that each type of solution presupposes the existence of at least one other type of solution. Trying to solve the problems of social order and collective- action thus leads one in a vicious circle since no solution seems to guarantee collective- action. While each type of solution might be necessary to either create, maintain or transform collective action, taken independently none is sufficient. To overcome the incompleteness problem, the book suggest that we investigate combinations of solutions to the collective-action problem. Second, every solution is evaluated from the point of view of logical consistency with the core assumptions of the collective- action approach. Many recent solutions to the collective-action problem have pushed back the limits of rational- choice explanations. Analysts have tried to synthesize noneconomic variables into economic models. Collective-action arguments have been extended to explain, for example, norms, trust ideology, reputation, institutions and leadership. It has to be questioned whether these recent extensions truly represent progress. Mark Irving Lichbach is Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland. |
