| The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan Contributor(s): Ramseyer, J. Mark (Author), Calvert, Randall (Editor), Eggertsson, Thrainn (Editor) |
|
 |
ISBN: 0521473977 ISBN-13: 9780521473972 Publisher: Cambridge University Press OUR PRICE: $72.20 Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats Published: July 1995 Annotation: In the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, Japan underwent two major shifts in political control. In the 1910s, the power of the oligarchy was eclipsed by that of a larger group of professional politicians. In the 1930s, the locus of power shifted again, this time to a set of independent military leaders. In The Politics of Oligarchy, J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth examine a key question of modern Japanese politics: Why were the Meiji oligarchs unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power? Using an analytical framework for oligarchic governments not specific to Japan, the authors ask why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what consequences those choices engendered for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth argue that understanding these shifts in power may clarify the general dynamics of oligarchic government, as well as theoretical aspects of the relationship between institutional structure and regime change. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Political Science | International Relations - General - History | Asia - Japan - Political Science | Comparative Politics |
| Dewey: 952.03 |
| LCCN: 95003514 |
| Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions |
| Physical Information: 0.97" H x 6.28" W x 9.23" (1.00 lbs) 248 pages |
| Themes: - Chronological Period - 20th Century - Cultural Region - Japanese |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: This book examines a key question of modern Japanese politics: why the Meiji oligarchs were unable to design institutions capable of protecting their power. The authors question why the oligarchs chose the political institutions they did, and what the consequences of those choices were for Japan's political competition, economic development, and diplomatic relations. Indeed, they argue, it was the oligarchs' very inability to agree among themselves on how to rule that prompted them to cut the military loose from civilian control--a decision that was to have disastrous consequences not only for Japan but for the rest of the world. |
