| The Sanctions Paradox Contributor(s): Drezner, Daniel W. (Author) |
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ISBN: 0521644151 ISBN-13: 9780521644150 Publisher: Cambridge University Press OUR PRICE: $54.14 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: August 1999 |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Political Science | International Relations - General - Political Science | Public Policy - Economic Policy |
| Dewey: 327.117 |
| LCCN: 98-39105 |
| Series: Cambridge Studies in International Relations |
| Physical Information: 0.88" H x 6.02" W x 8.99" (1.29 lbs) 364 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries will be most eager to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. States anticipate frequent conflicts with adversaries, and are therefore more willing to use sanctions. However, precisely because they anticipate more conflicts, sanctioned states will not concede, despite the cost. Economic sanctions are thus far less likely to be effective between adversaries than between allies. |
