Perfect Deterrence Contributor(s): Zagare, Frank C. (Author), Kilgour, D. Marc (Author), Frank C., Zagare (Author) |
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ISBN: 0521787130 ISBN-13: 9780521787130 Publisher: Cambridge University Press OUR PRICE: $54.14 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: September 2000 Annotation: This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using non-cooperative game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. The book's distinctive approach yields some surprising conclusions, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. |
Additional Information |
BISAC Categories: - Political Science | Security (national & International) - History | Military - Nuclear Warfare - Political Science | International Relations - Arms Control |
Dewey: 355.021 |
LCCN: 99088000 |
Lexile Measure: 1440 |
Series: Cambridge Studies in International Relations |
Physical Information: 1.1" H x 6" W x 8.94" (1.56 lbs) 442 pages |