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Gatekeepers of Growth: The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries Revised Edition
Contributor(s): Maxfield, Sylvia (Author)
ISBN: 0691002436     ISBN-13: 9780691002439
Publisher: Princeton University Press
OUR PRICE:   $55.10  
Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats
Published: August 1998
Qty:
Annotation: "This is an ambitious book that summarizes a lot of arguments and brings together a lot of evidence on a topic of growing interest to economists, political scientists and policymakers.... This book will be a valuable complement to the large and growing literature on the economics of central banks in industrial countries."--Stephen B. Webb, Senior Economist, The World Bank
Additional Information
BISAC Categories:
- Business & Economics | Banks & Banking
- Political Science | International Relations - General
- Business & Economics | Development - Economic Development
Dewey: 332.110
Lexile Measure: 1620
Physical Information: 0.49" H x 6.11" W x 9.24" (0.65 lbs) 192 pages
 
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc.
Publisher Description:

Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focused on central banking in emerging market countries. Surveying the dramatic worldwide trend toward increased central bank independence in the 1990s, the book argues that global forces must be at work. These forces, the book contends, center on the character of international financial intermediation. Going beyond an explanation of central bank independence, Sylvia Maxfield posits a general framework for analyzing the impact of different types of international capital flows on the politics of economic policymaking in developing countries.

The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire international creditworthiness. Historical analyses of central banks in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand, and quantitative analyses of a larger sample of developing countries corroborate this investor signaling explanation of broad trends in central bank status.