| Congressional Preemption: Regulatory Federalism Contributor(s): Zimmerman, Joseph F. (Author) |
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ISBN: 0791465632 ISBN-13: 9780791465639 Publisher: State University of New York Press OUR PRICE: $90.25 Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats Published: May 2005 Annotation: Congressional Preemption provides an in-depth account of the use of preemption powers by Congress to either partially or completely remove regulatory authority from state and local governments in a wide variety of fields. Author Joseph F. Zimmerman exposes the inadequacies of the two current theories of United States federalism--dual and cooperative--by exploring the impact of Congress' frequent use of its preemption powers since 1965. While the dual and cooperative federalism theories retain a degree of explanatory power. Zimmerman considers why they do not explain the profound systemic changes produced by congressional preemption. Other topics covered include congressional use of conditional grants-in-aid, crossover sanctions, tax credits, tax sanctions, and partial and complete redemption; the theory of political safeguards of federalism; and the Blackmun Thesis, which encourages states to seek relief from preemption statutes in Congress and not the courts. The book concludes with postulates of a broader theory of federalism and recommendations addressed to Congress to reinvigorate the federal system. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Political Science | American Government - Legislative Branch - Political Science | Civics & Citizenship |
| Dewey: 320.473 |
| LCCN: 2004027748 |
| Physical Information: 0.93" H x 6.16" W x 9.36" (1.18 lbs) 288 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: Congressional Preemption provides an in-depth account of the use of preemption powers by Congress to either partially or completely remove regulatory authority from state and local governments in a wide variety of fields. Author Joseph F. Zimmerman exposes the inadequacies of the two current theories of United States federalism--dual and cooperative--by exploring the impact of Congress' frequent use of its preemption powers since 1965. While the dual and cooperative federalism theories retain a degree of explanatory power, Zimmerman considers why they do not explain the profound systemic changes produced by congressional preemption. Other topics covered include congressional use of conditional grants-in-aid, crossover sanctions, tax credits, tax sanctions, and partial and complete redemption; the theory of political safeguards of federalism; and the Blackmun Thesis, which encourages states to seek relief from preemption statutes in Congress and not the courts. The book concludes with postulates of a broader theory of federalism and recommendations addressed to Congress to reinvigorate the federal system. |