| Why Not Annihilation Contributor(s): Joint Forces Staff College (Author) |
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ISBN: 1500382108 ISBN-13: 9781500382100 Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform OUR PRICE: $14.20 Product Type: Paperback Published: July 2014 |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Political Science | Terrorism |
| Physical Information: 0.18" H x 8.5" W x 11.02" (0.50 lbs) 88 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: The Global War on Terrorism cannot be won without a coherent commitment from national, defense, and military leadership to eradicate extremist organizations. The current National Security Strategy, referred to by one expert as only the third grand strategy in the history of the United States, cannot succeed on its own. An unambiguous military strategy of annihilation not only supports the current National Security Strategy but enables the other elements of national power - diplomatic, informational and economic - increased opportunities to achieve national objectives without the commitment of the military element.This paper proposes the term strategy of annihilation be introduced into the joint lexicon. Strategies of annihilation are perceived as resulting in a high number of casualties and confused with strategies of attrition. Combatant commanders employing a strategy of annihilation at the operational level are able to impact the strategic level of war. However, these strategies may be troop intensive based on the scope of national objectives, and are event, not timeline, driven.The current 1-4-2-1 force-sizing construct is not currently supportable given the current U.S. military authorized end strength; specifically, the land components are insufficient when analyzing the nature and locations of future combat operations. However, the American populous' fascination with technology and distrust of large standing Armies, as well as fiscal restraints hinder the expansion of the current military. Consequently, a military strategy of annihilation is difficult.Responsible political and military leaders must reassess the 1-4-2-1 force-sizing construct to achieve national objectives and address the environment of future conflict. |