| Alternatives to Retaliation in Response to State Sponsored Terrorist Attacks Contributor(s): Naval Postgraduate School (Author) |
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ISBN: 1505204658 ISBN-13: 9781505204650 Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform OUR PRICE: $12.30 Product Type: Paperback Published: November 2014 |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Political Science | Terrorism |
| Physical Information: 0.11" H x 8.5" W x 11" (0.33 lbs) 54 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: We consider a game played between a state sponsor of international terrorism, a terrorist organization and the victim of a terrorist attack. The state sponsor wishes to inflict as much damage to the victim as possible without risking retaliation. The victim state wishes to end these attacks as soon as possible, through non-retaliatory means if possible in order to avoid the penalty associated with retaliation. In this thesis we compare and contrast the victim strategies of buyout, political attrition, and espionage tactics in an effort to maximize the profit of the victim and end the game without retaliation. |