| Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi 1992 Edition Contributor(s): Selten, Reinhard (Editor) |
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ISBN: 3540550674 ISBN-13: 9783540550679 Publisher: Springer OUR PRICE: $104.49 Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats Published: February 1992 Annotation: The unifying theme of the 23 contributions to this book is the social interaction of rational individuals. The work of John C. Harsanyi on game theory, social choice, and the philosophy of science finds an echo in these essays. Contributions by well known game theorists and economists present a great variety of stimulating theoretical investigations. Part I contains six papers on non-cooperative game theory written by Maschler, Owen, Myerson, Peleg, Rosenm?ller, Hart and Mas-Collel. Part II with three contributions by Kalei, Samet, van Damme, d'Aspremont, and G?rard-Varet is devoted to the use of non-cooperative game theory in the analysis of problems of mechanism design. Basic questions of non-cooperative game theory are discussed in three essays by G?th, Hardin, and Sugden in Part III. Applied game models are discussed in three papers by Friedman, Selten, and Shubik in Part IV. Problems of social choice are investigated in Part V which deals with utilitarianism and related topics in five contributions by Hammond, Binmore, Arrow, Roemer, and Broome. Finally, Part VI contains three papers: an interdisciplinary comparison of physics and economics by Samuelson, a methodological essay by Brock, and an appraisal of the work of John C. Harsanyi. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Mathematics | Game Theory - Business & Economics | Economics - Theory - Business & Economics | Operations Research |
| Dewey: 519.3 |
| LCCN: 91045698 |
| Physical Information: 1" H x 6.14" W x 9.21" (1.78 lbs) 438 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: This book is a collection of essays in honor of John C. Harsanyi. Originally, we hoped that it would be ready in the year of his 70th birthday, but we did not quite succeed. It sometimes takes longer than anticipated to do things as well as one wants. I think that John Harsanyi will understand this. It is my desire to express our thanks to all those who helped to make the book possible, especially to the publishing house, the Springer Verlag. I am grateful to Hildegard Grober who assisted us in the organizational tasks connected to our editorial effort. I am deeply indebted to Horace W. Brock. His active support was extremely valuable. The results of my editorial efforts should partly be attributed to him. Reinhard Selten Table of Contents Introduction 1 I. Coopera. tive Game Theory The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments by Michael Maschler and Guillermo Owen 5 Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory by Roger B. Myerson 13 The Finagle Point for Characteristic Function Games by Guillermo Owen 35 Voting by Count and Account by Bezalel Peleg 45 Fee Games: (N)TU-Games with Incomplete Information by Joachim Rosenmftller 53 A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential 83 by Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell II. |