| The Effects of Agency Problems on the Financial Behavior, Performance, and Efficiency of German Industrial Stock Corporations Contributor(s): Wolf, J. Benedict (Author) |
|
 |
ISBN: 3631345747 ISBN-13: 9783631345740 Publisher: Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der W OUR PRICE: $128.44 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: March 1999 |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Business & Economics | Corporate & Business History - General - Business & Economics | Bookkeeping - Business & Economics | Finance - General |
| Dewey: 338.740 |
| Series: Europaeische Hochschulschriften / European University Studie |
| Physical Information: 1.4" H x 5.8" W x 8.2" (1.15 lbs) 414 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: Using a catalog of seven agency problem identifier variables such as block ownership and market segment traded in, 237 German industrial stock corporations are analyzed for the time period 1986-1992. Five sectors are also analyzed separately. Agency-problem related differences in financial behavior, performance, and cost efficiency are tested for using t-tests for mean differences and logistic regressions. The cost efficiency is estimated via stochastic maximum likelihood frontier functions. Manager-controlled firms prefer free cash flows as predicted. Owners favor debt and avoid new stock issues. Contrary to theory, manager-controlled companies do not show a poorer performance than owner-controlled firms. They do, however, operate more inefficiently than firms controlled by owners. |
