Competition Policy Analysis: An Integrated Approach 2009 Edition Contributor(s): Hüschelrath, Kai (Author) |
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ISBN: 379082089X ISBN-13: 9783790820898 Publisher: Physica-Verlag OUR PRICE: $104.49 Product Type: Paperback Published: September 2008 Annotation: The book develops an integrated approach of competition policy analysis. Based on the assumption that the deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour is the fundamental aim of competition policy rules and their enforcement, three pivotal levels of such an integrated approach are identified: a fundamental level, a strategic level as well as an operational level. Subsequent to the development of the approach, it is applied to three traditional areas of competition policy a" hard core cartels, horizontal mergers and predation a" before conclusions are drawn on how to ameliorate current competition policy. |
Additional Information |
BISAC Categories: - Business & Economics | Economics - Macroeconomics - Business & Economics | Industrial Management - Business & Economics | Industries - General |
Dewey: 338.604 |
LCCN: 2008934653 |
Series: Zew Economic Studies |
Physical Information: 1.2" H x 6.1" W x 9.3" (1.75 lbs) 530 pages |
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
Publisher Description: Competition policy is an integral and prominent part of economic policy-making in the European Union. The EU Treaty prescribes its member states to conduct economic policy 'in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition'. More precisely, the goal of EU competition policy is "to defend and develop effective competition in the common market" (European Commission, 2000: 7). Under its Commissioners van Miert, Monti and, most - cently, Kroes the EU Commission has stepped up its effort to pursue and achieve the aforementioned goal. A number of so-called hard-core cartels, such as the - torious "vitamin cartel" led by Roche, have been detected, tried in violation of Art. 81 of the Maastricht Accord and punished with severe fines. Also Microsoft was hit hard by the strong hand of the Commission having been severely fined for - ploiting a dominant market position. Economic analysis has been playing an increasingly significant role in the Commission's examination of competition law cases. This holds true in particular for merger control. Here, however, the Commission has had to accept some poi- ant defeats in court, such as the Court's reversals of Airtours-First Choice or GE- Honeywell. Among other things, the European Court of Justice found the e- nomic analysis as conducted by the EU's Directorate General for Competition to be flawed and the conclusions drawn not to be convincing. These rejections by the courts have stirred up the scholarly debate on the conceptual foundations of Eu- pean competition policy. |