| Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology Softcover Repri Edition Contributor(s): Husserl, Edmund (Author), Kersten, F. (Translator) |
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ISBN: 9024728525 ISBN-13: 9789024728527 Publisher: Springer OUR PRICE: $313.49 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: September 1983 Annotation: The present translation draws upon nearly half a century of Husserl scholarship as well as the many translations into English of other books by Husserl, occasioned by W.R. Boyce Gibson??'s pioneering translation of Ideas, First Book, in 1931. Based on the most recent German edition of the original text published in 1976 by Martinus Nijhoff and edited by Dr. Karl Schuhmann, the present translation offers an entirely new rendering into English of Husserl??'s great work, together with a representative selection of Husserl??'s own noted and revised parts of his book. Thus the translation makes available, for the first time in English, a significant commentary by Husserl on his own text over a period of about sixteen years. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Philosophy | Movements - Phenomenology - Science | Philosophy & Social Aspects |
| Dewey: 142.7 |
| Series: Edmund Husserl Collected Works |
| Physical Information: 0.91" H x 6.22" W x 9.18" (1.36 lbs) 401 pages |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: the Logische Untersuchungen, l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma- nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris- ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks. |