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Evolution of Moral Progress C
Contributor(s): Buchanan (Author)
ISBN: 0190868414     ISBN-13: 9780190868413
Publisher: Academic
OUR PRICE:   $51.30  
Product Type: Hardcover - Other Formats
Published: July 2018
Qty:
Temporarily out of stock - Will ship within 2 to 5 weeks
Additional Information
BISAC Categories:
- Philosophy | Ethics & Moral Philosophy
- Science | Philosophy & Social Aspects
- Science | Life Sciences - Evolution
Dewey: 170.9
LCCN: 2018009283
Physical Information: 1.5" H x 6.5" W x 9.3" (1.54 lbs) 440 pages
 
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc.
Publisher Description:
In The Evolution of Moral Progress, Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell resurrect the project of explaining moral progress. They avoid the errors of earlier attempts by drawing on a wide range of disciplines including moral and political philosophy, evolutionary biology, evolutionary
psychology, anthropology, history, and sociology.

Their focus is on one especially important type of moral progress: gains in inclusivity. They develop a framework to explain progress in inclusivity to also illuminate moral regression--the return to exclusivist and tribalistic moral beliefs and attitudes. Buchanan and Powell argue those
tribalistic moral responses are not hard-wired by evolution in human nature. Rather, human beings have an evolved adaptively plastic capacity for both inclusion and exclusion, depending on environmental conditions. Moral progress in the dimension of inclusivity is possible, but only to the
extent that human beings can create environments conducive to extending moral standing to all human beings and even to some animals. Buchanan and Powell take biological evolution seriously, but with a critical eye, while simultaneously recognizing the crucial role of culture in creating environments
in which moral progress can occur. The book avoids both biological and cultural determinism. Unlike earlier theories of moral progress, their theory provides a naturalistic account that is grounded in the best empirical work, and unlike earlier theories it does not present moral progress as
inevitable or as occurring in definite stages; but rather it recognizes the highly contingent and fragile character of moral improvement.