| The Rule of Law in Nascent Democracies: Judicial Politics in Argentina Contributor(s): Chavez, Rebecca Bill (Author) |
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ISBN: 0804748128 ISBN-13: 9780804748124 Publisher: Stanford University Press OUR PRICE: $71.25 Product Type: Hardcover Published: April 2004 Annotation: " This book is a welcome addition to a young but growing body of scholarly work on rule-of-law construction in new democracies from a political science perspective. Rebecca Bill Chavez develops a persuasive study of the conditions under which rule of law is more likely to emerge, through an analysis of judicial politics at the national level in Argentina and in two of its provinces, San Luis and Mendoza." -- Perspectives on Politics" " Chavez' s work is well written and reasoned and is an important contribution to the literature on judicial development in emerging democracies. The evidence cited in her work is compelling: Political competition does make a difference as to whether a judiciary will be able to operate free from political domination." -- Comparative Politics" |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Law | Jurisprudence - Political Science | Political Ideologies - Democracy - History | Latin America - General |
| Dewey: 340.11 |
| LCCN: 2004001040 |
| Physical Information: 0.91" H x 6.38" W x 9.3" (1.09 lbs) 272 pages |
| Themes: - Cultural Region - Latin America |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: This book explains how the rule of law emerges and how it survives in nascent democracies. The question of how nascent democracies construct and fortify the rule of law is fundamentally about power. By focusing on judicial autonomy, a key component of the rule of law, this book demonstrates that the fragmentation of political power is a necessary condition for the rule of law. In particular, it shows how party competition sets the stage for independent courts. Using case studies of Argentina at the national level and of two neighboring Argentine provinces, San Luis and Mendoza, this book also addresses patterns of power in the economic and societal realms. The distribution of economic resources among members of a divided elite fosters competitive politics and is therefore one path to the requisite political fragmentation. Where institutional power and economic power converge, a reform coalition of civil society actors can overcome monopolies in the political realm. |