| Kantian Humility ' Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves ' Revised Edition Contributor(s): Langton, Rae (Author) |
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ISBN: 0199243174 ISBN-13: 9780199243174 Publisher: Clarendon Press OUR PRICE: $57.95 Product Type: Paperback - Other Formats Published: March 2001 Annotation: In this refreshing and exceptional work, Rae Langton offers a new interpretation and defense of Kant's doctrine of "things in themselves." Kant distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, thus making a metaphysical distinction between intrinsic and relational properties of substances. Langton argues that his claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but epistemic humility; we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. This interpretation vindicates Kant's scientific realism and shows his primary/secondary quality distinction to be superior even to modern day competitors. And it answers the famous charge that Kant's tale of things in themselves is one that makes itself untellable. |
| Additional Information |
| BISAC Categories: - Philosophy | History & Surveys - General - Philosophy | Metaphysics |
| Dewey: 111 |
| Lexile Measure: 1310 |
| Physical Information: 0.52" H x 6.14" W x 9.21" (0.78 lbs) 246 pages |
| Themes: - Chronological Period - 18th Century - Cultural Region - Germany |
| Descriptions, Reviews, Etc. |
| Publisher Description: In this refreshing and exceptional work, Rae Langton offers a new interpretation and defense of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Kant distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, thus making a metaphysical distinction between intrinsic and relational properties of substances. Langton argues that his claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but epistemic humility; we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. This interpretation vindicates Kant's scientific realism and shows his primary/secondary quality distinction to be superior even to modern day competitors. And it answers the famous charge that Kant's tale of things in themselves is one that makes itself untellable. |